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Just a few decades after the Civil War, Southern conservatives gathered
at state constitutional conventions and codified a growing white backlash
against Reconstruction generally and black suffrage in particular.' Racial
animus was rarely masked: "Discrimination!" one Virginia delegate exclaimed.
"[T]hat, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for.., with a view to
the elimination of every negro voter .... 2 The conventions adopted a
panoply of voting barriers, including literacy and property tests,3 poll taxes,4
understanding clauses,5 and grandfather clauses.6 The purpose of these voting
1. For a brief history of the Southern constitutional conventions, see chapters 6 and 7 of J. MORGAN
KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS (1974) [hereinafter KOUSSER, SOUTHERN POLITICS] and
chapter 12 of C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEv SOUTH 1877-1913 (1951). To diminish black
voting strength, Southern conservatives had already used violence, voting fraud, corruption, gerrymandering,
at-large elections, and statutory suffrage restrictions. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief
History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 10 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 534 (1973).
Blacks were largely excluded from voting on whether to hold the new Southern constitutional conventions
and from becoming delegates to them. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two
Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra, at 135, 135 [hereinafter Kousser, Two
Reconstructions]; WOODWARD, supra, at 337. "Blacks" in this context refers only to black men, as women
were not guaranteed the right to vote until 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
2. 2 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF
VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Carter Glass, delegate). Glass
claimed that Virginia's new suffrage plan would "eliminate the darkey as a political factor in this State...
[allowing] for the complete supremacy of the white race." Id. See PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND
PARTY 84-86 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963) (1932) for discussion of the open racial discrimination at these
conventions.
3. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 331-32.
4. By 1908, all 11 ex-Confederate states had adopted the poll tax, "and the Afro-American was always
its chief intended victim." J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for
the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 34 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Kousser,
Undermining].
5. Understanding clauses required voters to show that they understood a given section of the state
constitution. If the discriminatory intent of such a discretionary clause was not already obvious, a statement
from a delegate to the Virginia constitutional convention made it so: "I expect the examination with which
the black man will be confronted, to be inspired by the same spirit that inspires every man upon this floor
and in this convention. I would not expect an impartial administration of the clause." VIRGINIA
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 2972 (statement of William A. Dunning,* delegate); see also KIRK H.
PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 218 (1918); WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 332
('The obvious subterfuge of the understanding clause was offensive to men of conscience.").
6. Grandfather clauses guaranteed the franchise to men who had voted-or whose fathers or
grandfathers had voted-before the Civil War, thus preventing the newly adopted "race-neutral" provisions
from disenfranchising poor or uneducated whites, whose votes the Southern conservatives sought.
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restrictions was to disenfranchise as many blacks as possible without violating
the recently ratified Fifteenth Amendment, 7 which prohibited denying the right
to vote on account of race. 8 The effort was remarkably successful: blacks
made up 44% of the electorate in Louisiana after the Civil War, but less than
1% in 1920.9 Almost 70% of eligible blacks were registered to vote in
Mississippi in 1867; less than 6% were registered two years after that state's
1890 disenfranchising convention. I The effect was as apparent among black
elected officials: In the eleven former Confederate states, 324 blacks were
elected to state legislatures and Congress in 1872, but only five were elected
in 1900."
Criminal disenfranchisement-the denial of the vote to citizens convicted
of crimes-was the most subtle method of excluding blacks from the franchise.
Narrower in scope than literacy tests or poll taxes and easier to justify than
understanding or grandfather clauses, criminal disenfranchisement laws
provided the Southern states with "insurance if courts struck down more
blatantly unconstitutional clauses."'12 The insurance has paid off: A century
after the disenfranchising conventions, criminal disenfranchisement is the only
substantial voting restriction of the era that remains in effect.' 3 Currently, all
but three states deprive incarcerated offenders of the vote; 14 thirty-five states
WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 332-35.
7. The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV.
8. See KOUSSER, SOUTHERN POLITICS, supra note 1, at 141; VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2,
at 3076 (noting that aim of Virginia convention was, according to one delegate, "to discriminate to the very
extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitution") (statement of Carter
Glass, delegate); LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 83-84 n.* (discussing Southern delegates' fear that federal
courts might strike down their new constitutions for violating Fifteenth Amendment).
9. Karen M. Arrington, The Struggle To Gain the Right To Vote: 1787-1965, in VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 25, 30 (Karen M. Arrington & William L. Taylor eds., 1992).
10. Id.
11. Kousser, Two Reconstructions, supra note 1, at 140, Table I.
12. Kousser, Undennining, supra note 4, at 35. Kousser claims that ostensibly neutral laws excluding
criminals from the electorate provided white supremacists with "a critical line of defense in case other parts
of the suffrage plan did not withstand attack." Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 619 n.9 (11th Cir.
1984) (citing deposition of historian J. Morgan Kousser).
13. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)-(d), banned literacy tests on the ground that
these tests had at times been used with racially discriminatory purpose and effect. See also South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act, including its prohibition of literacy
tests). In Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540-54 (1965) (prohibiting poll tax as prerequisite to voting
in federal election), the Supreme Court recognized that poll taxes were historically used to disenfranchise
blacks. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (disallowing denial of the vote in federal elections for failure to pay
poll tax); see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (prohibiting poll tax as
prerequisite to voting in state election). The Supreme Court invalidated understanding clauses in Louisiana
v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); grandfather clauses in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); and white primaries
in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Supreme Court
also struck down property tests in Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), without directly
addressing the way in which these laws had been used to disenfranchise blacks disproportionately.
14. "Incarcerated offenders" refers to convicted offenders who are under correctional supervision in
state or federal prisons. Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont are the only states that generally allow
incarcerated offenders to vote. ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 1, ch. 55, § 42
19931 Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement
disenfranchise nonincarcerated offenders, including those on probation and
parole; 5 and fourteen states disenfranchise ex-offenders for life. 16 As a
(West 1991) (disenfranchisement only for election offenses); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 807 (1986) (voting
allowed by absentee ballot during incarceration). Responding to a 1989 survey on inmate voting policy in
the 50 states, a Maine official said, "Inmates are allowed and encouraged to vote. The prisons in Maine
support inmate voting rights." Survey, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Apr. 1989, at 10. In fact, Maine allows
inmates to vote by absentee ballot and permits election officials to visit the prisons to facilitate inmate
voting. Id. By way of comparison, the former West Germany allowed most common criminals to vote by
absentee ballot, and all prisoners in Sweden are permitted to vote. JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 28 (1983).
In October 1992, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a survey of civil disabilities of convicted
felons and reported that "in a number of jurisdictions there was no general agreement as to how the law
should be interpreted and applied, and that the law in any event was continually being amended and/or
reinterpreted." OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-
BY-STATE SURVEY, at "Disclaimer" (1992) [hereinafter CIVIL DISABILmEs]. Similarly, the information on
different states' criminal disenfranchisement policies provided throughout this Note reflects current law as
indicated by state constitutions, and state codes or statutes; actual state practices may vary from the written
law.
15. "Nonincarcerated offenders" refers to convicted criminals under the supervision of a state or
federal correctional system who are not incarcerated, including those who are on probation and parole, as
well as those who receive suspended sentences. Because plea bargaining and prison overcrowding are so
common, nonincarcerated offenders constitute about three-quarters of all those under correctional
supervision. Louis W. JANKOWSKI, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at 5
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice 1992) (62% on probation; 12% on parole). Twenty-
one states disenfranchise nonincarcerated offenders who are felons or who have committed infamous crimes
or other enumerated offenses. Most of these states automatically restore the right to vote to offenders who
have fully completed their sentences. Including the 14 states that disenfranchise all offenders not pardoned,
see infra note 16, there are 35 states that disenfranchise nonincarcerated offenders. The following state laws
disenfranchise incarcerated and nonincarcerated offenders, but not ex-offenders: ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030
(1988), ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.241 (1986); ARK. CONSI. art. III, §§ 1-2, amended by ARK. CONST. amend.
51, § 11; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-103(4) (,Vest Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a) (1993);
DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (convicted felon's right to vote is restored two years after expiration of sentence);
DEL. CONST. art. V, § 7 (offenders convicted of certain election offenses prohibited from voting for ten
years following completion of sentence); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1981) (same); GA. CONST. art.
II, § I, para. 3(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-219(a)(5)(1) (1993) (felony involving moral turpitude); IDAHO
CODE § 18-310 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615(1), (2) (1988); LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 20;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:102(l) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. CONST. art. VII, § I; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
201.014, subd. 2(a) (Vest 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.165, subd. I (West 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
115.133(2)(l)-(2), 561.026(1) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115.133(2)(3), 561.026(2) (person
convicted of an election offense is forever disqualified from voting) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
112, 29-2264 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,118(5) (1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:51-3, 19:4-1(8) (West
1982); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(1)-(S) (McKinney 1978); N.C. CONST art. VI, § 2(3); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 13-1 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 4-101(1), 4-120 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993); R.I. CONST. art.
2, § 1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-120(4)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); TEX. CONST. art VI, § I; TEX. ELEC.
CODE ANN. § II.002(4)(A) (West Supp. 1993) (convicted felon's right to vote is restored two years after
discharge of sentence); W. VA. CONST. art. 4, § 1; W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
6.03(l)(b) (Vest Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 304.078 (West 1991).
16. "Ex-offenders" refers to convicted criminals who have been fully released from the supervision
of a state or federal correctional system. In 14 states, felons or offenders who commit infamous crimes or
other enumerated offenses are disenfranchised for life unless the state pardons them or otherwise restores
their voting rights. The following state laws disenfranchise ex-offenders, as well as incarcerated and
nonincarcerated offenders: ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (but see infra notes 54-59, striking down the
provision in section 182 disenfranchising offenders convicted of crimes of"moral turpitude"); ARIZ. CONST.
art. VII, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 13-912, 16-101(5) (1992) (right to vote automatically restored
for first-time offenders after completion of sentence); FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
944.292 (Harrison 1991); IOwA CONST. art. II, § 5 (infamous crime); KY. CONST. § 145 (felony, high
misdemeanor, treason, bribery in an election); MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (larceny or other infamous crime);
MD. ANN. CODE art 33, §§ 3-4 (1990) (right to vote automatically restored for first-time offenders
following completion of sentence); MISS. CONST. ANN. art. 12, § 241 (enumerated offenses); NEV. CONST.
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result, the right to vote is denied to millions of American citizens,"' a
disproportionate share of whom are nonwhite.'
Like other voting barriers, laws disqualifying criminals from voting existed
in the South before the constitutional conventions at the turn of the century,
and before blacks had won the right to vote. But between 1890 and 1910,
many Southern states tailored their criminal disenfranchisement laws, along
with other preexisting voting qualifications, to increase the effect of these laws
on black citizens. For example, Mississippi's 1890 constitutional convention,
which became a model for other states,' 9 replaced an 1869 constitutional
provision disenfranchising citizens convicted of "any crime" with a narrower
section disenfranchising only those convicted of certain crimes, which blacks
were supposedly more likely than whites to commit.'0 The racially
art. II, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (infamous crime); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-
19-143 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (1990); UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (treason and election
offenses); VA. CONST. art. II, § I; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42 (Michie 1985); WASH. CONST. art. VI, §§
1, 3 (infamous crime); WYO. STAT. § 6-10-106 (1988).
17. This Note estimates that at least four million Americans are denied the right to vote because of
their status as criminal offenders or ex-offenders. This estimate is based on the following calculations: In
1991, the most recent year for which the following information is available, federal and state prisons held
824,133 prisoners. TRACY J. SNELL, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 52
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice 1993). Excluding prisoners in Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont-who retain the right to vote, see supra note 14-812,281 offenders were,
in 1991, incarcerated in states that disenfranchise incarcerated offenders. In 1990, the most recent year for
which the following information is available, 2,522,125 offenders were on probation and 456,803 offenders
were on parole; 1,627,118 of the probationers and 298,445 of the parolees were under the jurisdiction of
states that disenfranchise nonincarcerated offenders. See JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 25, 117; and see
generally supra note 15 for a list of states that disenfranchise nonincarcerated offenders. Therefore, an
estimated 1,925,563 noninearcerated offenders on probation and parole are denied the right to vote (not
including other nonincarcerated offenders, such as those serving suspended sentences). While it is
impossible to tabulate precisely the number of ex-offenders in the United States, let alone the number who
are disenfranchised, very rough estimates can be made. Using a conservative formula, a 1987 study
calculated that there were more than 14 million convicted felons in the United States. Velmer S. Burton,
Jr. et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Statutes, FELONY
PROBATION, Sept. 1987, at 52 n.1. Fourteen states disenfranchise non-pardoned offenders for life. See supra
note 16. Although these states have relatively small total populations, six of these states are in the South,
where a disproportionately large percentage of all Americans under correctional supervision reside. See
JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that Southern states account for 39% of total U.S. adult population
under correctional supervision). The conservative estimation that disenfranchised ex-offenders make up one-
tenth of the total number of convicts supports the claim that there are about 1.4 million disenfranchised ex-
offenders in the United States. Therefore, the total number of disenfranchised offenders-including those
who are incarcerated, nonincarcerated, and ex-offenders--is approximately 4.1 million.
18. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text for statistical data on the percentage of
disenfranchised offenders who are nonwhite.
19. According to an early historical account, Mississippi's 1890 constitutional convention "paved the
way for wholesale exclusion of the negroes on perfectly legal grounds.... The ultimate ideal, of course,
was to exclude all negroes and no whites." PORTER, supra note 5, at 210. "The Mississippi Plan as the
American Way" is the title of one chapter of C. Vann Woodward's history of the era. See WOODWARD,
supra note I, at 321-49; see also id. at 334 ("State conventions borrowed freely from each other .... ).
Disenfranchisement of blacks occurred to some extent in at least I 1 other states in the region: South
Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Florida, Arkansas,
and Texas. Id. at 321; see also PORTER, supra note 5, at 191-227.
20. According to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, blacks were more likely than whites to be
"convicted of bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury,
forgery, embezzlement or bigamy." Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 265-66 (1896).
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discriminatory intent of this change was clear to the Mississippi Supreme
Court when it reviewed the new law six years after its adoption:
[T]he convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the
exercise of the franchise by the negro race. By reason of its previous
condition of servitude and dependence, this race had acquired or
accentuated certain particularities of habit, of temperament and of
character, which clearly distinguished it, as a race, from that of the
whites-a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal members
given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites.
Restrained by the federal constitution from discriminating against the
negro race, the convention discriminated against its characteristics
and the offenses to which its weaker members were prone....
Burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under false pretenses were
declared to be disqualifications, while robbery and murder, and other
crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient, were not.2'
At their conventions, other states, including South Carolina (1895),
Louisiana (1898), Alabama (1901), and Virginia (1901-02), also
disenfranchised criminals selectively with the intent of disqualifying a
disproportionate number of blacks.22 As in Mississippi, legislators in these
states thought that blacks were more likely to commit "furtive offenses" such
as petty theft than "robust crimes" such as murder. "It is not difficult to
perceive how these elaborate regulations were designed to discriminate against
the Negro," one historian wrote in 1944 about South Carolina. "Among the
disqualifying crimes were those to which he was especially prone: thievery,
adultery, arson, wife-beating, housebreaking, and attempted rape. Such crimes
as murder and fighting, to which the white man was as disposed as the Negro,
were significantly omitted from the list."23 John Fielding Bums, the author
of the Alabama constitutional provision disenfranchising criminals, "estimated
the crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify sixty percent of the
Negroes. ' 24 The exaggerated nature of this claim underscores the racist intent
21. Id. at 266-67 (emphasis added). In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), a black offender
convicted by an all-white jury challenged the disenfranchisement provision of the Mississippi Constitution,
alleging that blacks were excluded from the jury that tried him because of intentional disenfranchisement
(a citizen barred from voting could not be a juror in Mississippi). Id. at 214. The U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged the racist intent illustrated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Ratliff but dismissed the
claim, stating that the Mississippi disenfranchisement laws "do not on their face discriminate between the
races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under
them." Id. at 225.
22. See Kousser, Undermining, supra note 4, at 34-35; PORTER, supra note 5, at 208-27; John C. Rose,
Negro Suffrage: The Constitutional Point of View, I AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 25-27 (1906).
23. FRANCIS B. SIMPKINS, PITCHFORK BEN TILLMAN 297 (1944).
24. JIMMIE F. GROSS, ALABAMA POLrTCS AND THE NEGRO, 1874-1901, at 244 (1969). Bums, ajustice
of the peace, also wanted to disenfranchise "those who are bastards or loafers or who may be infected with
any loathsome or contagious disease." MALCOLM C. MCMILLAN, CONSTITUIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
ALABAMA, 1798-1901, at 275 n.76 (1955).
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of the provision.25 Indeed, at the time of the constitutional conventions,
observers recognized both the purpose of these new disenfranchising laws and
the grave impact the laws would have on blacks.26
Today, scholars widely acknowledge the historically racist motives
underlying criminal disenfranchisement in the South. The Supreme Court
has also recognized this history. In 1985, the Court held in Hunter v.
Underwood that an Alabama law disenfranchising certain criminal offenders
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because the law
had a disproportionate impact on blacks and was adopted with racially
discriminatory intent. The president of the 1901 Alabama constitutional
convention that adopted the disputed section had declared to his fellow
delegates: "And what is it that we want to do? Why it is within the limits
imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this
State."29 Underwood marked the first time that a court struck down a criminal
disenfranchisement law on account of racial discrimination.30 Surprisingly, the
25. See Kousser, Undermining, supra note 4, at 45 n.34. The inclusion of miscegenation as a
disenfranchising crime in some states provides further evidence of the racially discriminatory intent of these
laws. Id. at 35.
26. An 1899 publication of the American Negro Academy maintained:
The crimes mentioned as disqualifing [sic] from voting are such as it is always easy, when
desirable, to convict the Negro of committing. Under the present method of administering
justice in the states where these disfranchising constitutions operate, the Negro has neither any
guarantee of a fair and impartial trial nor any protection against malicious prosecution or false
accusations when it is convenient to convict him.
JOHN L. LOVE, THE DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE NEGRO 16 (1899). Seven years later, an article on black
suffrage in the first volume of The American Political Science Review included the following observation
about the selective uses of criminal disenfranchisement:
In South Carolina a man convicted of fornication or adultery is disfranchised for life. In
Maryland the former is not punishable at all, and a ten dollar fine is the maximum penalty for
the latter. It is possible that the enumeration of such offenses as fomication, adultery, bigamy,
and wife-beating among the crimes which work a forfeiture of citizenship may have been
inspired, in part at least, by the belief that they were offenses to the commission of which
negroes were prone, and for which negroes could be much more readily convicted than white
men.
Rose, supra note 22, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
27. See, e.g., Katharine I. Butler, Denial or Abridgment of the Right To Vote: What Does It Mean?,
in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 44, 45 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985) ("[Vlague restrictions... for conviction
of certain crimes served as not-so-subtle means to continue to disfranchise blacks .... ); John H. Franklin,
"Legal" Disfranchisement of the Negro, 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 241, 245 (1957), reprinted in 6 AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND THE RIGHT To VOTE 207, 211 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) (noting that South Carolina
disenfranchised persons convicted of certain crimes, "who were invariably convicted Negroes"); BERNARD
GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 9 (1992) ("[T]he
list of disfranchising crimes was expanded to include offenses believed to be committed more frequently
by blacks.").
28. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
29. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, MAY
21ST, 1901, TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901, at "Second Day" (1901) [hereinafter ALABAMA CONVENTION]
(statement of John B. Knox).
30. Eight years before, in 1977, a federal court had struck down another provision of the Alabama
Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of wife-beating. The court held that the law unconstitutionally
classified offenders based on their gender "[Tihe [male] plaintiff has been denied the right to vote because
of a conviction for assault and battery against his spouse. Yet, women who are convicted of assault and
battery against their spouses do not lose their right to vote." Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D.
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case has not paved the way for similarly successful suits alleging that other
states' criminal disenfranchisement laws were adopted with racially
discriminatory intent.
But, as this Note will demonstrate, a plaintiff challenging criminal
disenfranchisement no longer needs to prove discriminatory intent. In 1982,
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("the Act"),3 1 the federal
law enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and explicitly established a results test
for section 2 of the Act. 2 Section 2 now prohibits states from imposing
electoral qualifications that result in a minority group having less opportunity
than other voters to participate in the electoral process.33 Remarkably, the
significance of this legislation for race-based challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement like Underwood has been almost completely unrealized.'
This Note recommends a new litigation strategy against criminal
disenfranchisement. Criminal disenfranchisement is an outright barrier to
voting that, like the poll tax and literacy test, was adopted in some states with
racially discriminatory intent and has operated throughout our nation with
racially discriminatory results.35  This Note focuses on the racially
Ala. 1977). In fact, wife-beating provisions were often adopted with the intent of discriminating against
blacks. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
In Allen v. Ellisor, in 1981, the Fourth Circuit remanded a case on appeal so that a district court could
consider a plaintiff's allegations that a South Carolina law disenfranchising criminal offenders was, like the
Alabama law struck down four years later in Underwood, adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose.
Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also id. at 401 (Mumaghan, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[r]ace is not a crime"); id. at 404-05 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing historical
material suggesting that criminal disenfranchisement laws were tailored in South Carolina to
disproportionately affect blacks). However, the Supreme Court vacated the case in light of a change to the
challenged statute. Allen v. Ellisor, 454 U.S. 807, vacating 664 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
31. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973ff-6
(1986 & Supp. 1993)).
32. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
34. Underwood was already being litigated when Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.
Underwood v. Hunter, 604 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1979). In the one case in which a criminal
disenfranchisement law was challenged under the amended Voting Rights Act, the court misread the Act,
placing an unwarranted burden of proof on the plaintiffs. Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn.
1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 74-89 and
accompanying text. One reason that the Voting Rights Act has not been applied more vigorously to criminal
disenfranchisement is that recently voting rights advocates have focused their efforts on challenging
districting and apportionment schemes that dilute minority votes and prevent minority candidates from
being elected. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
35. John Buggs summarized the relationship between .racial discrimination and criminal
disenfranchisement well in 1974, when, as staff director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, he
addressed a House Judiciary Subcommittee during a hearing on ex-offenders' voting rights: "In the past,
States have carefully selected disfranchising crimes in order to disqualify a disproportionate number of
black voters." Ex-Offenders Voting Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974)
[hereinafter Ex-Offenders Voting Rights] (statement of John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights). Most importantly, Buggs noted that, looking at the disparate modem conviction rates for
whites and nonwhites, "one gets a rather shocking idea of how disfranchising prohibitions based on felony
convictions affect minorities." Id. at 12. Thus, he concluded, "even in those States where the lists of
disqualifying crimes were not selected with the purpose of disfranchising blacks ... [criminal
disenfranchisement laws] established an invidious racial discrimination against minority citizens." Id. at 13.
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discriminatory nature of criminal disenfranchisement laws not to encourage
states to reformulate these laws in a more "race neutral" manner but to give
federal courts a new theory that will allow them to review these laws and
strike them down. Courts do not have this opportunity when faced with per se
challenges to criminal disenfranchisement that do not allege racial
discrimination because the Supreme Court has held that states can, in general,
constitutionally deprive offenders of the right to vote. Therefore, plaintiffs are
most likely to succeed in challenging criminal disenfranchisement laws if they
allege that these laws violate the Voting Rights Act because they
disproportionately affect minorities.36
Part I of this Note reviews and critiques court decisions in cases
challenging criminal disenfranchisement laws under the Constitution and the
Voting Rights Act. Part II maintains that plaintiffs can rely on the results test
in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to establish that criminal
disenfranchisement laws are illegal for two reasons: first, because these laws
deny the vote to a class of individuals who are disproportionately nonwhite;
and second, because these laws dilute the voting strength of minority
communities. Nonwhites are substantially more likely than whites to be
disenfranchised as criminals; and states' justifications for disenfranchising
criminals are highly tenuous.37 Part II concludes that the Voting Rights Act
is the most effective weapon against criminal disenfranchisement that critics
of the practice have at their disposal.
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW: How COURTS HAVE RULED ON CHALLENGES
TO CRIIviNAL DISENFRANCISEMENT
According to the Supreme Court, the right to vote is fundamental because
it preserves other rights.38 The Constitution prohibits denial of the right to
vote on the basis of race, sex, failure to pay a poll tax, and age. 9 Most other
voting restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 States must show that the electoral
36. Plaintiffs who have evidence that criminal disenfranchisement laws in their state were adopted with
racially discriminatory intent should also allege constitutional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and of the Fifteenth Amendment.
37. See infra notes 106-14 and 125-39 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). But see Owens v.
Barnes, 711 F2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (claiming that right of felons to vote is not fundamental).
39. U.S. CONST. amends. XV (race), XIX (gender), XXIV (failure to pay poll tax), XXVI (age, for
those age 18 and over). The text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment actually prohibits states from denying
the vote to citizens on account of their "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV (emphasis added). Taken literally, these words suggest that states cannot constitutionally
disenfranchise offenders convicted of tax evasion and other tax-related crimes.
40. The notion of strict judicial scrutiny emanates from the renowned footnote 4 of United States v.
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law in question promotes a compelling state interest, is narrowly tailored, and
is the least restrictive method of achieving the state's interest.4" Suffrage
qualifications are also subject to challenge under the Voting Rights Act, which
prohibits any voting law or scheme that results in a minority group having less
opportunity than other groups to participate in the electoral process.42
A. Constitutional Challenges to Criminal Disenfranchisement
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has decided two important
cases dealing with criminal offenders' constitutional right to vote. In
Richardson v. Ramirez, in 1974, the Court declared that states may generally
deprive offenders of the right to vote without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.43 In Hunter v. Underwood, in 1985,
the Court held that a law disenfranchising certain offenders violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because the law was adopted
with racially discriminatory intent and continued to have a disproportionate
impact on nonwhite offenders.'
1. Evading Strict Scrutiny: Ramirez and "Other Crime"
In 1973, three California ex-felons who had been incarcerated and released
from parole challenged a state law under which election officials had refused
to let them register to vote.45 The California Supreme Court agreed with the
ex-felons that the state's disenfranchising law violated the Equal Protection
Clause.46 The election officials appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari and, in Richardson v. Ramirez, reversed the California
court's ruling.47
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (subjecting poll tax
to strict scrutiny); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 (subjecting durational residence requirements to strict scrutiny).
41. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 342-43; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 241-42 (1970); Kramer,
395 U.S. at 627.
42. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
43. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). Before Ramirez, the Supreme Court had
summarily affirmed lower court decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to state laws disenfranchising
convicted offenders. See Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 961 (1973), aff'g mem., 352 . Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C.
1972); Beacham v. Braterman, 396 U.S. 12, aff'g mem., 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969). The Supreme
Court had also suggested in dicta that felons could constitutionally be excluded from the franchise. See
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); see also Green v. Board of
Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967) (upholding state statute denying vote to those convicted of federal
felonies), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(holding that statute denying vote to convicted criminals does not violate U.S. Constitution).
44. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
45. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974).
46. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1357.
47. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). While the Court in Ramirez held that the California
law disenfranchising ex-felons did not, on its face, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court remanded the case to the California courts to consider whether the disenfranchising
1993]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 537
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Ramirez, stated that section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from denying persons
equal protection of the laws, must be read in light of section 2 of the
amendment, which implies that states have the right to disenfranchise those
who participate in "rebellion, or other crime. 48 Thus, the Ramirez majority
claimed that section l's strict scrutiny standard, which usually applies to laws
that restrict the right to vote, does not apply to laws disenfranchising felons:
"§ 1 ... could not have been meant to bar outright a form of
disenfranchisement" which "has an affirmative sanction in § 2.
A number of commentators, both before and since Ramirez, have
challenged this reading of section 2.50 Some have suggested that the 39th
Congress added the words "or other crime" to "rebellion" only to ensure that
Southern rebels could be excluded easily from the franchise during the
Reconstruction period." Justice Marshall, dissenting in Ramirez, noted that
the majority's reading of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
limitation on section 1 could lead to "absurd results," including allowing states
to disenfranchise citizens for seduction under promise to marry, conspiracy to
operate a motor vehicle without a muffler, vagrancy, or breaking a water
law was applied with "such a total lack of uniformity" that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
56.
48. Id. at 42. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, in relevant part:
[Wihen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
Since the 39th Congress was not prepared to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to punish Southern states that refused to allow blacks to vote. Under
this provision, states that denied voting rights to male citizens over 21 were supposed to lose representation
in Congress in proportion to the number of eligible voters who had been unjustly disenfranchised (but states
could disenfranchise citizens who participated in "rebellion" or "other crime"). In practice, this enforcement
mechanism was not applied against the Southern states when they disenfranchised blacks following
Reconstruction. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 515 (1944).
49. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55, 54.
50. See, e.g., Elizabeth Du Fresne & William Du Fresne, The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi
To Vote for Judges": Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 112,
137-38 (1969) ("[lt is not conceivable that today 'other crime' can possibly be read as any other
crime.... [S]ection two only allows disfranchisement of persons who have committed a crime that would
rationally be related to the corruption of the electoral system."); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:
A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 303 (1976) ("[T]here is not a word in the fourteenth
amendment suggesting that the exemptions in section two's formula are in any way a barrier to the judicial
application of section one in voting rights cases, whether or not they involve the rights of ex-convicts.").
51. See William NV. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To Vote, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 33, 58. Another constitutional scholar
noted that because the representation formula in section 2 allowed for denial of the vote to those who were
not male citizens over 21, but only abridgement of voting rights for those participating in "rebellion, or
other crime," the "permanent denial of the right to vote to an ex-convict, who has completed his sentence
and thus paid his debt, was not contemplated by the § 2 formula for representation." Shapiro, supra note
50, at 303-04 n.34.
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pipe.52 "Even a jaywalking or traffic conviction could conceivably lead to
disenfranchisement, since § 2 does not differentiate between felonies and
misdemeanors," Justice Marshall added.53
Still, unless the Supreme Court reverses its holding in Ramirez, lower
courts must continue to defer to the majority of the Court's reading of "other
crime." As a result, constitutional challenges to criminal disenfranchisement
as such will almost certainly fall. Constitutional claims alleging the racially
discriminatory intent of criminal disenfranchisement laws should have a greater
chance of success.
2. Race and Criminal Disenfranchisement: Underwood and the Need to
Show Intent
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court put an important limitation
on the "other crime" doctrine established in Ramirez by unanimously declaring
that "§ 2 was not designed to permit... purposeful racial discrimination...
which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."54 The plaintiffs
in Underwood were two men, one black and one white, who had been
"blocked from the voting rolls" by Alabama election officials because each had
been convicted of presenting a worthless check, a misdemeanor of "moral
turpitude" according to the Alabama attorney general.55 The plaintiffs brought
an action in federal court claiming that section 182 of the Alabama
Constitution, under which they had been disenfranchised, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because it was adopted with
intent to discriminate against blacks and was fulfilling its intended effect.56
As one delegate to the 1901 Alabama constitutional convention that adopted
52. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 75 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall noted, some state
statutes actually disenfranchised citizens who had committed these offenses. See Gary L. Reback, Note,
Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1973) (noting that
Alabama disenfranchises offenders convicted of vagrancy and that North Dakota disenfranchises offenders
convicted of breaking a water pipe); see also Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 418 (Cal. 1966) (noting that
California could disenfranchise offenders convicted of seduction under promise of marriage or conspiracy
to operate a motor vehicle without a muffler).
53. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 75 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An offender disenfranchised because of
a minor crime such as those mentioned by Justice Marshall would not, after Ramirez, have the advantage
of holding the state to the Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny standard. But such an offender could
still allege that a state law disenfranchising a citizen for such a minor offense does not meet the lower
equal protection scrutiny standard of rational relation to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ('The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.").
54. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
55. Id. at 224.
56. Id. The plaintiffs alleged four additional causes of action that were not dispositive. Underwood v.
Hunter, 730 E2d 614, 616 (11th Cir. 1984).
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the disputed section had claimed, "[e]verybody knows that this Convention has
done its best to disfranchise the negro in Alabama."57
The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the
Court of Appeals' ruling that found substantial evidence that discriminatory
intent was a motivating factor of section 182, that the provision had a
discriminatory impact, and that it would not have been adopted absent the
impermissible intent.58 This last point is particularly important for plaintiffs
who are considering challenging the racially discriminatory intent of a criminal
disenfranchisement law-the Court noted that once a plaintiff shows that racial
discrimination was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the enactment
of a challenged law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to demonstrate
that the law would have been enacted had there been no racially discriminatory
purpose.59
For the litigation strategy outlined in this Note, Ramirez and Underwood
are most significant as precedential guideposts that should direct constitutional
challenges of criminal disenfranchisement toward equal protection or Fifteenth
Amendment claims that specifically allege racially discriminatory intent.6" As
Underwood showed, disenfranchising laws can be successfully challenged
under the Fourteenth Amendment if plaintiffs establish that the laws were
adopted with intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Though many
plaintiffs and their attorneys might suppose that they cannot meet the burden
of proving that a disenfranchising provision was adopted with discriminatory
intent, the introduction to this Note shows that such a history of discriminatory
57. ALABAMA CONVENTION, supra note 29, at "Seventy-Ninth Day," 2 (statement of Mr. Freeman,
delegate).
58. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 227-31. The finding of intent to discriminate was critical to the Court's
ruling that the Alabama disenfranchising provision violated the Equal Protection Clause; discriminatory
impact alone, the Court noted, would not have established a violation. Thus, the Underwood Court
considered the Alabama provision under the equal protection framework set forth in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Underwood, 471 U.S. at 227-28.
59. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 228. Therefore, a state that argues that criminal disenfranchisement was
adopted in order to disenfranchise blacks and poor whites, for example, must show that the law would have
been adopted even if the only purpose was to disenfranchise poor whites. See id. at 230-33.
60. Plaintiffs should not ignore the potency of the Fifteenth Amendment in the fight against criminal
disenfranchisement. Just as constitutional scholars have recently applied the Thirteenth Amendment to
nontraditional scenarios-see, e.g., Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery. A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1992)-the potential of the
Fifteenth Amendment should be fully explored. See infra note 149. Other constitutional strategies against
criminal disenfranchisement should also be pursued. For example, since disenfranchisement essentially
silences offenders, and voting is one of the most fundamental means by which a citizen can speak or
express herself politically, disenfranchising laws may trigger strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN.
L. REv. 549 (1985); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1948) ("The principle
of the freedom of speech ... is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall
be decided by universal suffrage."); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (courts faced with
challenges to state election laws must balance "character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments" against "precise interests put forth by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule"). But see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 60 (1970) (in the process of "assimilating the right to vote to First
Amendment rights ... there is history, and there are other considerations, to overcome").
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purpose is apparent in many Southern states.6 t More importantly, under the
Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs challenging criminal disenfranchisement no longer
have to meet the burden of establishing discriminatory intent.62
B. Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act was adopted to buttress the Fifteenth
Amendment 63 and remedy what the Supreme Court has called the "insidious
and pervasive evil"64 of racial discrimination in American voting.65 The Act
has led to the disqualification of many voting barriers and to a remarkable
increase in black voting and representation.66
61. The history outlined at the introduction of this Note will not, however, provide all plaintiffs with
the evidence of racially discriminatory intent required to support a constitutional challenge to a criminal
disenfranchisement law. Several of the Southem states have changed their disenfranchising provisions since
the turn of the century. For example, when Mississippi amended its constitution in 1972, it added murder
and rape to, and removed burglary from, the list of disenfranchising crimes. MIss. CONSI. art. XII, § 241.
Also, in some Southern and most non-Southem states, criminal disenfranchisement may have been
employed without racially discriminatory intent. Ultimately, though, the results test of the Voting Rights
Act means that a plaintiff should not have to rely on intent to prove the illegality of criminal
disenfranchisement.
62. The availability of the results test does not mean that a plaintiff should not try to adduce
impermissible intent, but that even a plaintiff with proof of racially discriminatory intent should apply that
evidence primarily to a Voting Rights Act claim, for the following reasons: First, courts generally avoid
ruling on constitutional questions if they can resolve a legal claim on statutory grounds instead. See, e.g.,
Escambia County v. MeMillan, 466 U.S. 48 (1984) (applying the principle set forth by Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), to a
voting rights case). Second, while the Act does not require evidence of discriminatory intent, such evidence
can help to establish a violation of the results test. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-08 (1981) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also infra text
accompanying note 124. Third, the Voting Rights Act allows a plaintiff to proceed by showing either
discriminatory intent or discriminatory results, or both, so that a failure to prove one of the two types of
discrimination will not be fatal to a claim. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 205-08.
63. For a history of the Fifteenth Amendment's passage, see generally WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT
To VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFrEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); JOHN M. MATHEWS,
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909). For a more explicit
discussion of the weakness of the Fifteenth Amendment, see Eric Foner, From Slavery to Citizenship:
Blacks and the Right To Vote, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 55, 63 (Donald W.
Rogers ed., 1992) ("[The Fifteenth Amendment's] language left open the possibility of... ostensibly
nonracial requirements that could, and would, be used to disfranchise the vast majority of southem black
men.").
64. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
65. Though initially aimed at recalcitrant Southern states that continued to maintain barriers to black
suffrage, the most important section of the Act-section 2-applies to the whole nation. Section 5 of the
Act, which requires preclearanee of changes in voting laws, applies only to jurisdictions with the worst
histories of racial discrimination, most of which are in the South. A relevant question regarding criminal
disenfranchisement is whether states subject to section 5 preclearance since the Act was passed in 1965
have actually precleared changes to their lists of disqualifying crimes with the U.S. Attomey General or
a federal court in the District of Columbia, as required. See, e.g., Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 399 (4th
Cir.) (en bane) (noting defendant state's claim that changes in electoral law affecting right of criminal
offenders to vote were precleared under section 5 by the Attorney General), vacated as moot, 454 U.S. 807
(1981); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (holding that even minor
changes to voting laws and procedures must be precleared under section 5); NAACP v. Georgia, 494 F.
Supp. 668, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same); SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 186-92.
66. "Between 1964 and 1988 the percentage of voting-age blacks registered in the eleven southern
states increased from 43.3 percent to approximately 63.7 percent. Black registrants in the five Deep South
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1. Section 2 and the Results Test
The success of the Voting Rights Act has not come easily. Faced with a
continuing lack of political equality for nonwhites, as well as narrow
interpretations of the Act by the Supreme Court, Congress has repeatedly
amended the Act to increase minority voting strength.67 In 1980, for example,
the Supreme Court held in City of Mobile v. Bolden68 that, as in constitutional
claims, proof of discriminatory intent was required to show a violation of
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.69 Recognizing that the intent standard was
"unacceptably difficult" for plaintiffs in most voting rights cases to meet,
Congress responded by amending section 2 of the Act in 1982 "to restore the
legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Bolden."70 Congress formally enacted a results test,
affirming that a plaintiff did not need to "demonstrate that the challenged
election law or procedure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory
purpose."" t Under the results test, an election law violates the Act if, under
the "totality of the circumstances," the law results in a protected minority
group z having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
states increased in the same period from 22.5 percent to about 65.2 percent." Davidson, supra note 1, at
43. Consequently, the Voting Rights Act "is generally regarded as the most successful piece of federal civil
rights legislation ever enacted," Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 1, at 52, 52; see also Timothy G. O'Rourke, The 1982
Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note I, at
85, 86 ("[T]he act has taken on a symbolic importance that extends well beyond the increased numbers of
black and Hispanic voters and minority elected officials."). But see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 75-88 (1987) (chronicle of the "Ultimate Voting Rights
Act"); Davidson, supra note 1, at 44, 46 (describing the Act as "more successful than its supporters in 1965
had reason to expect," yet noting that "only 1.4 percent of officeholders in the United States are black and
0.8 percent are Hispanic, compared with 12.4 percent and 8.0 percent of their respective proportions of the
population"); Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96,
110-14 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority
Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 1, at 66, 82 ("Progress
substantial as it has been, is incomplete.").
67. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. No.
97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
68. 446 U.S. 55 (1980); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 192.
69. 446 U.S. at 60-61. The Bolden decision's intent test replaced the de facto results test that had been
established by White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (striking down Texas multimember electoral
districts), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 193-94.
70. SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 192.
71. Id. at 193. The text of section 2 now reads, in pertinent part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color ....
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (emphasis added).
72. Racial and language minorities are "protected" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1982). See
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (Latinos challenging at-large election); Windy
Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (Native Americans challenging at-large
elections); Su Sun Bai, Comment, Affirmative Pursuit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific Americans:
Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1991).
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participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. 73
2. Misconstruing the Results Test: A Case Study
Only one federal case challenging criminal disenfranchisement has been
brought under the Voting Rights Act since Congress amended the Act in
1982.74 In 1984, Charles Wesley, a 27-year-old black ex-Marine, brought suit
in federal district court challenging a Tennessee law that deprived him of his
right to vote while he served a plea-bargained suspended sentence.75 A public
interest law project, the Natural Rights Center, joined Wesley as a plaintiff in
the case. 6 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' case for failure to state
a claim. It reached this unfortunate conclusion by misinterpreting the Act's
results test, essentially reverting to the intent standard used in constitutional
claims.77
The district court in Wesley v. Collins stated that the plaintiffs' claim was
insufficient as a matter of law because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled three
requirements that the court purported to derive from the Act. First, the court
required a showing of disparate racial impact. The plaintiffs fulfilled this
requirement. 8 Second, the court looked to the "totality of the circumstances"
in the case, claiming that "it is only in the context of historical and social
forces that a challenged practice can be determined to 'result' in
discriminatorily diminished access to the political process."79 The plaintiffs
also succeeded in meeting the court's "totality of the circumstances" burden. 0
Third, the court insisted that "a causal connection must be established between
the indicia of historically-rooted discrimination and the Tennessee statute
disenfranchising felons."8' Here, according to the district court, the plaintiffs
failed: "[T]he nexus between discriminatory exclusion of blacks from the
political process and disenfranchisement of felons simply cannot be drawn....
73. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)).
74. "The context of dilution in this case is unique and has not previously been presented before a
federal court." Wesley v. Collins, 605 R Supp. 802, 807 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1986). The plaintiffs in Wesley v. Collins also alleged that Tennessee's criminal disenfranchisement
law violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 803.
75. Wesley pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the crime of larceny. Id. at 804.
76. Id.
77. Congress had explicitly rejected the intent test. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
78. Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812. Indeed, the plaintiffs projected-perhaps somewhat
hyperbolically-that if Tennessee's criminal disenfranchisement laws continued unchecked over another
50 years, the result would be the disenfranchisement of one-half of Tennessee's blacks. Id. at 813 n.13.
79. Id. at 811.
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[N]o violation occurs ... [because the law does not bear] the taint of
historically-rooted discrimination."82
The Wesley district court's misapplication of the results test occurred
largely because of the third requirement. The plaintiffs' fulfillment of both the
first and second requirements should have provided sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie violation of the Voting Rights Act. As the court itself
acknowledged, "a finding that a state practice imposes a disproportionate
impact on blacks and occurs in a social context characterized by a history of
discrimination against blacks at the polls, warrants the rebuttable presumption
that a violation of the Voting Rights Act has occurred., 83 However, the
district dourt's creation of an additional requirement-to prove a causal
connection between the history of racial discrimination in Tennessee and the
state's disenfranchising statute-essentially required the plaintiffs to show
intent, contradicting both the language and the legislative history of section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.84
For this reason alone, the Sixth Circuit should have reversed the lower
court's decision on appeal.85 Additionally, the errors of the district court's
decision should have been clear because, just a few months after the district
court ruling, the Supreme Court declared in Hunter v. Underwood that criminal
disenfranchisement laws had been adopted in parts of the South with racially
discriminatory intent.86 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged Underwood, as well
as the plaintiffs' claim that, if their case had not been dismissed, discovery
might have produced evidence of intent to discriminate in the history of
Tennessee's disenfranchisement provision similar to that which was found in
Alabama by the plaintiffs in Underwood. However, the Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiffs' request for discovery as "a fishing expedition for
unspecified evidence."87 The appellate court reiterated the district court's
reasoning and held that the state had shown a "compelling rationale for
enacting the statute here in issue. '88 Even if this last statement were true, the
Senate legislative history of the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act
emphasizes that "even a consistently applied practice premised on a racially
neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that
the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process."89
82. Id. at 812-13. The Court also quoted Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968), for the proposition that "[d]isenfranchising the felon never has
been attributed to discriminatory exclusion of racial minorities from the polls." Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 813.
83. Id. at 812.
84. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
85. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'g 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
86. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262-63. Of course, if the Voting Rights Act's results test had been properly
applied, the plaintiffs would not have had to produce evidence of racially discriminatory intent at all.
88. Id. at 1261.
89. SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 207 n.1 17. Ignoring this important directive, the appellate court
instead adopted the constitutional standard used by the Undenvood Court, see note 59 and accompanying
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II. THE PROMISE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR CHALLENGES TO
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The sponsors of the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act may not
have foreseen challenges to criminal disenfranchisement based on the results
test in section 2 of the Act.' Yet, the results test was meant to apply to all
conceivable voting regulations including, of course, absolute disqualification
from the electorate. 91 In 1991, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Voting
Rights Act "should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the broadest
possible scope' in combatting racial discrimination."92 As Part I of this Note
explained, there is no clear precedent governing challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws under the Act's results test because in the one case
where plaintiffs made such a claim, the district court misapplied the results test
and dismissed the plaintiffs' case before trial. Furthermore, since the results
test was introduced in 1982, much of the general case law in the area of the
Voting Rights Act has become muddled.93 This Note clarifies the standards
applicable to challenges brought under the Act by looking closely at the Act's
text, and considered the defendant's rationale for the challenged law. Cf. United States v. Marengo County
Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir.) (suggesting that state's rationale for voting restriction is more
relevant in cases examining intent than in cases that rely upon results test of Voting Rights Act), cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
90. But the application of the Voting Rights Act to criminal disenfranchisement echoes the
metaphorical statement made by President Lyndon Johnson as he signed the Act: "The vote is the most
powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls
which imprison men because they are different from other men." STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURsUrr OF
POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL POLMCS, 1965-1982, at 3-4 (1985) (quoting Lyndon
Johnson) (emphasis added).
91. As amended, section 2 covers all voting qualifications, standards, practices, and procedures. Pub.
L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982). "Section 2 remains the major statutory prohibition of all voting
rights discrimination." SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 207. The district court in Wesley v. Collins
suggested that criminal disenfranchisement laws could not violate the Voting Rights Act because the
affected offenders had the same opportunity, before they committed disenfranchising crimes, as any other
individual to vote. Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). The flaw in this argument
is that section 2 states that a violation of the Act occurs when a minority group has less opportunity than
other groups to participate in the electoral process. Nothing in the Act suggests it does not apply to a
certain group because of the choices made by its members, including the decision to commit a crime.
Furthermore, nothing in the Voting Rights Act suggests that it does not apply to voting restrictions
that affect prisoners, even though disenfranchisement of incarcerated offenders raises issues distinct from
those raised by disenfranchisement of nonincarcerated offenders and ex-offenders. Courts regularly give
special consideration to issues of security and order in penal institutions. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (upholding restrictions on prisoners' religious freedom, while noting
the "deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators," and
the state's interest in "institutional order and security"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987) (citing
similar reasons to uphold restrictions on inmate marriages); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412
(1974) (citing similar reasons to uphold censorship of inmates' personal correspondence). For a discussion
of the merits of extending voting rights to incarcerated offenders, see Ex-Offenders Voting Rights, supra
note 35, at 16 (Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, remarking that "practically this may not now be
realizable but I think [allowing incarcerated offenders to vote] ought to be the goal eventually if we are
interested in a truly universal franchise").
92. Chisom v. Roemer, IIl S. Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
93. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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language and legislative history. Section 2 expressly prohibits any electoral
qualification that denies or abridges voting rights in a manner that results in
members of a minority group having "less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice."94 Courts that apply the Act consistently with the Act's
language and legislative history should find that criminal disenfranchisement
laws violate the Act in two ways. First, these laws deny the vote to a class of
individuals who are disproportionately nonwhite. Second, these laws dilute (or
abridge) the voting strength of minority communities. Vote denial can be
shown by statistical data. Vote dilution can be established by statistical data
in conjunction with evidentiary factors such as the tenuousness of the state's
justifications for criminal disenfranchisement.
A. Distinguishing Vote Denial from Vote Dilution
The Voting Rights Act's results test has expanded the scope of the Act
dramatically.95 At its inception in 1965, the Act was used almost exclusively
to challenge election practices that caused outright vote denial, such as literacy
tests and poll taxes.96 In recent years, though, courts and voting rights
94. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)). For
a longer excerpt from section 2, see supra note 71.
95. The Supreme Court has ruled that the results test applies to the election of judges. Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., III S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354,
2356 (1991). Lower courts have liberally applied section 2 to the election of almost all public officials, and
to such practices as dual or separate registration and the hiring of poll officials. See Mississippi State
Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (dual registration and satellite
registration), aff'd, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Graddick, 615 . Supp. 239 (M.D. Ala. 1985)
(failure to appoint black poll officials); see also Lucas v. Townsend, 908 F2d 851 (11 th Cir. 1990), vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Board of Pub. Educ. and Orphanage for Bibb County v. Lucas,
111 S. Ct. 2845 (1991) (proposals covering several issues in a single referendum); Carrollton Branch of
NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987) (sole county commissioner form of government). But
see Butts v. City of New York, 779 F2d 141, 148-51 (2d Cir. 1985) (40% plurality requirement not
covered by section 2).
Indeed, voting rights scholars currently debate the extent to which section 2 litigation can and should
be used not only to allow minority voters to elect candidates of their choice, but also to guarantee
minorities proportional representation and influence in legislative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Binny Miller,
Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102
YALE L.J. 105 (1992) (advocating application of Act to diluted postelection influence of minority voters);
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1126 (1991) (noting prejudice in "third generation" post-election phase); Pamela
S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1,
31, 31 n.112 (1991) [hereinafter, Karlan, Undoing] (discussing failure of "influence" claims and citing
relevant cases); Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (1988) (arguing that Act should guarantee minorities not only
more electoral success, but more political influence). The scope of the Voting Rights Act briefly became
a topic of public interest during the summer of 1993 as a result of President Clinton's controversial decision
to withdraw his nomination of Professor Guinier for the position of Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post amid Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1993, at Al.
96. See Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437,438,442 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-
1973ff-6 (1986 & Supp. 1993)).
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advocates have been preoccupied with the "political thicket" of vote
dilution-so much so that they have largely neglected the denial of the vote
to a class of millions of criminal offenders who are overwhelmingly
nonwhite.93 Minority vote dilution should continue to be challenged
vigilantly-in fact, as Section B of this Part suggests, dilution claims should
be brought against criminal disenfranchisement laws. But the recent, intensive
focus of dilution claims on the drawing of electoral district boundaries should
not eclipse extant cases of outright vote denial that disproportionately affect
minorities.99
Court opinions often do not distinguish between vote denial and vote
dilution, and courts have applied vote dilution standards to cases involving
vote denial.'0 But, in challenges to criminal disenfranchisement, there are
good reasons to allege both vote denial and vote dilution, and to do so in
separate counts. For example, scholars across the political spectrum agree that
vote denial is, and should be, covered by the Act, but not all of these scholars
are willing to say the same about vote dilution.' 0' Also, in adjudicating vote
denial claims, courts can usually ascertain the harmful results of the challenged
law directly, as well as the way in which that law affects minorities, because
97. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
98. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 27, at 45 (describing unrestricted ballot access for blacks as a "fait
accompli"); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-39 (1992) (describing absence of barriers to casting
of ballots). Professor Guinier describes efforts to eradicate vote denial and vote dilution as first and second
generation challenges, respectively. Guinier, supra note 95, at 1093-94; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Maps
and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 184 (1989) (noting shift in focus from vote denial to vote dilution); Karlan,
Undoing, supra note 95, at 30 (describing "[tihe elevation of the ability to elect to talismanic status").
99. Ironically, because the Voting Rights Act eliminated almost all outright suffrage barriers, it now
seems anachronistic to apply the Act to overt disenfranchisement laws-instead of to inscrutable districting
schemes that dilute votes. But we should not forget that, before the current focus on vote dilution, the Act
was used mostly to remedy cases of vote denial, such as restrictions based on literacy tests and poll taxes.
See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438, 442 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973ff-6
(1986 & Supp. 1993)). In addition to criminal disenfranchisement, other practices discourage minorities
from voting to such an extent that the practices are indistinguishable from those which actually deny the
vote outright. These practices include "purges of registration rolls; changing polling places on short notice
(or without any notice at all); the establishment of difficult registration procedures; decreasing the number
of voting machines in minority areas; and the threat of reprisals." Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote
Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILuTION, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (footnotes omitted).
100. For example, in Mississippi State Chapter Operation PUSH v. Allain, a federal court ruled that
certain restrictive registration policies in Mississippi violated the results test of the Voting Rights Act. The
PUSH court certified a class of plaintiffs that included unregistered black voters and registered black voters.
Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1261 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd,
932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991). Though the case dealt at least in part with vote denial (i.e., the unregistered
voters claimed that the challenged election procedures prevented them from registering and voting), the
court applied the Senate evidentiary factors developed for vote dilution cases, see infra note 120 and
accompanying text, and claimed to be "of the opinion that the same language and analysis is applicable
to this voter registration case." Id. at 1263.
101. See, e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COuNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORrrY
VOTING RIGHTS (1987).
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the inability to vote is itself the prohibited result."t 2 In dilution cases, since
the plaintiffs are still allowed to vote, section 2's "totality of the
circumstances" analysis is more relevant because courts must rely on indirect
evidentiary factors to measure the harmful results of the challenged election
scheme."03 Vote dilution claims may nevertheless be advantageous because
the plaintiffs in these claims-members of the minority community at
large-may have more resources than do disenfranchised offenders, and the
plaintiffs also do not suffer from the stigma of having been convicted of
crimes.
B. Establishing Vote Denial
A vote denial claim can be brought by one or more nonwhite
disenfranchised offenders."° These plaintiffs should be able to establish that
"on account of their race"' 5-that is, because they are not white-they are
more likely than other citizens to be disenfranchised, and thus they have less
opportunity than other citizens to participate in the electoral process. The
disparate racial impact of disenfranchising laws can be demonstrated simply
with statistics that show the race of disenfranchised offenders in the state in
question. 10 6 National figures indicate that minorities make up an inordinately
large percentage of all convicted offenders and, consequently, of those who are
102. See Issacharoff, supra note 98, at 1842 (noting that in vote denial cases "the precise harms were
easy to identify").
103. For example, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 64-80 (1986), the Court looked primarily
at the extent of minority representation and racial bloc voting.
104. Although a plaintiff could challenge a state's disenfranchisement law solely in his or her capacity
as an individual, this Note assumes that a plaintiff should and probably would bring suit on behalf of all
others similarly situated. This was the situation in Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985),
aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text. The offender's
capacity to sue under the Act may depend on whether he or she is a member of a minority group protected
by the Voting Rights Act. See supra note '12. The constitutional challenge to Alabama's disenfranchisement
law in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), was brought by two plaintiffs, one black and one white.
The district court certified a plaintiff class of citizens disenfranchised for "nonprison" offenses represented
by Underwood, who was white, and Edwards, who was black. In addition, the court treated Edwards as
a representative for a subclass of black members of the plaintiff class. Id. at 224.
105. The Act prohibits any "voting qualification ... which results in a denial ... of the right.., to
vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). The Senate report on the 1982 amendment
to the Act declared that "it is patently clear[] that Congress has used the words 'on account of race or
color' in the Act to mean 'with respect to' race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial
discrimination." SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 206 n.109.
106. See generally JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 31, 122 (most recent statistics showing racial
breakdown of offenders on probation and parole); SNELL, supra note 17, at 57 (most recent statistics
showing the racial breakdown of offenders in prison); RICHARD SOLARI, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING
PROGRAM, 1988, at 12 (1992) (most recent statistics showing racial breakdown of felons sentenced in state
courts). The disparate racial impact of a criminal disenfranchisement law may be relatively easy to adduce.
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Underwood, "blacks are by even the most modest estimates at least 1.7
times as likely as whites to suffer disfranchisement." Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 620 (11th Cir.
1984). The Supreme Court also noted that the Eleventh Circuit accepted the claim of an expert witness that
"by January 1903 section 182 had disfranchised approximately ten times as many blacks as whites." Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (quoting 730 F.2d at 620).
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denied the right to vote. 7 In 1988, blacks made up 41% of all persons
convicted of felonies in state courts.'08 State statistics should provide
plaintiffs with formidable evidence of the disproportionate impact of specific
criminal disenfranchisement laws on nonwhite incarcerated and nonincarcerated
offenders.
For example, in Illinois, where incarcerated offenders are denied the vote,
63% of prisoners are black.0 9 Yet, blacks make up only 15% of Illinois's
general population.1t In New York, where offenders on parole are prohibited
from voting, 49% of parolees are black and 31% are Hispanic."' At the
same time, blacks make up 16%, and Hispanics 12%, of the total population
of New York."2  In Florida, where offenders on probation are
disenfranchised, 26% of probationers are black, and approximately 50% are
Hispanic." 3  Florida's general population is 14% black and 12%
Hispanic."' Although comparable figures do not exist for ex-offenders, there
is a direct correlation between the racial composition of incarcerated and
nonincarcerated populations on the one hand, and ex-offenders on the other.
Thus, a plaintiff can challenge a state's law disenfranchising ex-offenders using
107. Some critics of this approach may argue that nonwhites make up a disproportionate share of those
who are disenfranchised solely because they commit a disproportionate share of all crimes. However, there
is ample evidence of racial discrimination throughout the criminal justice system. For example, Professor
Norval Morris notes that the arrest ratio of blacks to whites for serious "index" crimes is about 3.6 to I,
yet the prison ratio is about 7 to 1. Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence Is There That Race
Influences Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111, 112 (1988). For a discussion of
racial bias throughout the criminal justice system, see Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal
Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988).
Also, observers who are quick to compare the use of statistics to prove discrimination in
disenfranchisement cases with the failed use of such statistics in cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987) (statistical proof of disparate racial impact did not render the death penalty cruel and
unusual), should note that McCleskey involved constitutional challenges that required proof of
discriminatory intent. As incongruous as it seems to prohibit discriminatory results in voting but not in
capital punishment, this is the current state of the law.
108. SOLARI, supra note 106, at 12. (This source does not have figures for Latinos). Blacks make up
12.1% of the U.S. population. 111 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OFTHE UNrrED STATES, 1991, at 22 (1991) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
109. SNELL, supra note 17, at 57.
110. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 108, at 22.
111. JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 121, 122. According to this source's definitions, a person of
Hispanic origin may be of any race. Id. at 3.
112. STATISTICAL ABSTRAC, supra note 108, at 22. The law-and-order crackdown surrounding the
"drug war" is one reason why the population of America's prisons is disproportionately nonwhite. For
example, in the State of New York, 886 drug offenders accounted for 11% of all persons committed to
prison (7,959) in 1980; in 1992, 11,209 drug offenders accounted for 45% of all persons committed to
prison (25,099). Ninety-three percent of the drug offenders in New York state prisons are black or Latino;
only 6.3% of drug offenders are white. At the same time, "[s]tudies and experience have shown that the
majority of people who use and sell drugs in [New York] and the nation are white." The Correctional
Association of New York, Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Drug Offenders in New York State (Feb. 1993)
(citing figures from the New York State Department of Correctional Services, the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, and the Legal Action Center) (fact sheet on file with author).
113. JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 31-32.
114. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 108, at 22.
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statistics showing that a disproportionate share of the state's incarcerated and
nonincarcerated offenders are nonwhite.
The Senate legislative history of the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights
Act indicates that courts should consider statistical data of the sort presented
above: "If the plaintiff proceeds under the 'results test,' then the court would
assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of
objective factors."' 15 The foregoing statistics are objective factors that
directly demonstrate the disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement laws
on nonwhites. Therefore, these statistics, on their own, should provide
plaintiffs with adequate evidence to satisfy section 2's "totality of the
circumstances" analysis."
6
C. Establishing Vote Dilution
Vote dilution claims are conceptually distinct from vote denial claims
because dilution claims focus on the overall harm done to a minority group's
voting strength." 7 Plaintiffs who are not disenfranchised can bring a Voting
Rights Act claim alleging that a criminal disenfranchisement law dilutes
minority voting power. For example, members of a black community may
bring a class action suit challenging a state's criminal disenfranchisement law
on the grounds that, even though the law does not deny the vote to any of
them as individuals, the law disproportionately weakens the voting strength of
their community because blacks are five times as likely as whites to be
disenfranchised under the law."8
Unlike plaintiffs alleging vote denial, plaintiffs alleging vote dilution claim
that they have been indirectly harmed by disenfranchisement laws. Therefore,
vote dilution plaintiffs may need more than just statistical data to satisfy the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. Toward that end, vote dilution
plaintiffs can supplement their statistical evidence by offering evidence of the
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 205 (emphasis added).
116. The Senate Report noted that no voting practice would automatically violate the Voting Rights
Act. To demonstrate a violation, plaintiffs must show that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
challenged law results in "unequal access to the electoral process" Id. at 193. Ifa court holds that statistical
proof of a criminal disenfranchisement law's disproportionate effect on minorities does not satisfy the
totality of the circumstances analysis, plaintiffs can resort to the indirect evidentiary factors discussed infra
notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
117. However, the Supreme Court has treated allegations of vote denial and vote dilution with equal
concern. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can be affected
by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."); see also Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., noting that
the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes" of voting
discrimination).
118. This 5:1 ratio is an approximation derived from the following statistics: In 1990, the most recent
year for which these data are available, 7.9% of the black adult population and 1.7% of the white adult
population were on probation, in jail, in prison, or on parole. JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 6 (figures based
on the resident U.S. population, 18 years of age and older). Obviously, the ratio will vary from state to
state.
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existence of factors enumerated by the Senate when it amended the Voting
Rights Act in 1982.9 These "Senate factors" include: (1) a history of
official discrimination in voting; (2) the existence of racially polarized voting;
(3) use of certain election schemes, including large districts, majority vote
requirements, and anti-single-shot provisions; (4) denial of access to the
candidate slating process; (5) discrimination in education, employment, and
health care that hinders the ability of minorities to participate in the political
process; (6) racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) minority electoral
success; (8) elected officials' failure to respond to minority needs; and (9)
whether the policy underlying the voting practice is "tenuous."'20 Plaintiffs
are free to use all, some, or none of these evidentiary factors in the course of
trying to establish that the challenged law dilutes minority voting power.'
The relevant factors will vary depending on the nature of the case, though
some factors have been found to be generally revealing and useful. 22 Lack
of minority electoral success, for example, is almost always cited by plaintiffs
bringing dilution claims because it suggests that the minority community's
voting strength is weaker than it should be and has been diminished by the
challenged law. Plaintiffs also routinely point to evidence of racial bloc voting
to show that minority electoral success will only come about if minority vote
dilution is remedied, because the white majority generally will not vote for
minority candidates. In cases challenging criminal disenfranchisement, minority
electoral success and racial bloc voting are again relevant, but two other Senate
factors may be particularly persuasive: the history of racial discrimination and,
119. In explaining the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, the Senate report on the 1982
amendment to the Act listed nine evidentiary factors, which had been derived from the decisions of the
Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976). This list, however, was not intended to be exhaustive or to exclude other evidence that
plaintiffs might adduce in attempting to show a violation of the Act. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 62,
at 207; LmGATiON UNDER THE VOTING rom S ACT OF 1965, at 16 (Morton Stavis ed., 1986).
120. SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 206-07.
121. "While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors
will be indicative of the alleged dilution .... [There is no requirement that any particular number of
factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." SENATE REPORT, supra note 62,
at 207; see also Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 350 (E.D. La. 1983) ("To the extent that the enumerated
factors are not factually relevant, they may be replaced or substituted by other, more meaningful factors.").
122. For example, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Supreme Court simplified the
totality of the circumstances analysis for vote dilution cases challenging at-large and multimember elections.
After reviewing the nine Senate factors, the Gingles court decided that two factors were most revealing in
these types of cases: the extent of racially polarized voting and minority electoral success. Id. at 52, 74.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, also outlined three criteria that a court should find in order to
establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act in such cases: first, the minority group in question had to be
"sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-member district;" second,
the minority had to be "politically cohesive;" and third, the majority had to vote as a bloc so that it "usually
... defeat[ed] the minority's preferred candidate." ld. at 50-51. While lower courts have interpreted the
three-prong Gingles test in different ways, the test was developed for electoral districting cases and
probably does not apply to vote dilution cases that involve other electoral regulations, such as criminal
disenfranchisement provisions. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 59.
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even more, the tenuousness of the state's justifications for
disenfranchisement."
1. History of Racial Discrimination in Voting
Plaintiffs in most states should be able to prove a general history of racial
discrimination in voting, since blacks and other minorities were denied the vote
for a substantial portion of this nation's history. Also, as the introduction to
this Note suggests, plaintiffs in many parts of the South should be able to
establish that their states specifically adopted criminal disenfranchisement laws
with racial animus. Thus, the racially discriminatory intent of many Southern
states' criminal disenfranchisement laws is relevant not only to constitutional
claims, as mentioned in Part I, but as an evidentiary factor in vote dilution
claims under the Voting Rights Act.' 24
2. Tenuousness of State Justifications for Disenfranchisement
At the evidentiary stage of a Voting Rights Act claim, a state's
justification for an electoral qualification is relevant only if it is tenuous. A
state's interest in disenfranchisement, or lack thereof, is a factor that can only
work to the advantage of the plaintiff. In other words, a state cannot defend
a challenge to a voting restriction under the Act simply by claiming that the
restriction is justifiable. In the case of criminal disenfranchisement laws, this
distinction may not be important because disenfranchising laws are difficult
to justify." s Two decades ago, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[c]ourts have
been hard pressed to define the state interest served by laws disenfranchising
persons convicted of crimes."' 26 In 1981, the American Bar Association
recommended that "[p]ersons convicted of any offense should not be deprived
of the right to vote either by law or by the action or inaction of government
officials."' 27
123. The eighth factor, elected officials' failure to respond to minority needs, may also be relevant,
particularly since the disenfranchisement of criminal offenders ensures that they will remain, in the eyes
of politicians, a powerless constituency whose interests need not be addressed.
124. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 205.
125. Many of the justifications for disenfranchisement have been articulated and critiqued before. See,
e.g., Walter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929, 1218-33 (1970); Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's
Right To Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 721 (1973); Reback, supra note 52;
Douglas R. Tims, Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive Punishment, 7 SW. U.
L. REv. 124 (1975); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality and "The Purity
of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Citizenship]; Note, The Equal
Protection Clause as a Limitation on the States' Power To Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 297 (1967) [hereinafter Note, Equal Protection]; Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580 (1974) [hereinafter Note, The Need for Reform].
126. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972).
127. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: LEGAL STATUS OF
PRISONERS 145 (1981) (standard 23-8.4). The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code states that "a
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Disenfranchisement is most often defined as one of a number of
nonpunitive civil disabilities that accompany a criminal conviction.
128
Proponents of this view claim that criminal disenfranchisement protects "the
purity of the ballot box" in two ways. 29 First, it prevents offenders from
voting retributively against the criminal justice officials who prosecuted and
convicted them. 130  However, the Supreme Court has stated that it is
unconstitutional for a state to fence out a class of voters because of the way
they might vote.' 3' Second, defenders of the nonpunitive view claim that
offenders are more likely to commit election crimes than are other citizens and
that disenfranchisement of offenders is necessary, therefore, to safeguard the
integrity of voting.132 But courts have noted that states already have more
effective ways of deterring election fraud, including penal codes against these
offenses. 33 Punitive justifications for criminal disenfranchisement are also
weak, despite the fact that they have some historical support. 1"4 A state that
person who is convicted of a crime shall be disqualified ... from voting ... only so long as he is
committed under a sentence of imprisonment." MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.3 (1985). Similar views have
been expressed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
(recommending that all states repeal mandatory disenfranchisement) and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (proposing a uniform law to restore voting rights to offenders upon
release from incarceration, parole, or probation). See Ex-Offenders Voting Rights, supra note 35, at 31.
128. For example, in addition to losing the right to vote, a convicted criminal may be deprived of
employment opportunities, professional licenses, and the right to hold office and sit on a jury. See generally
CIVIL DISABILITIES, supra note 14; Burton et al., supra note 17; Grant et al., supra note 125. Loss of the
right to vote is not the only collateral consequence of a conviction that is difficult to justify. In Wyoming,
certain convictions may make an offender ineligible for a professional license to become a barber school
operator, a dental hygienist, or a cosmetologist. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-7-311, § 33-12-135, § 33-15-121
(Michie 1992). Supporting the view that disenfranchisement is nonpunitive is the fact that disqualifying
provisions typically are located in statutes and constitutional provisions that deal with elections, not criminal
law. See laws collected supra at notes 14-16. Courts generally have subscribed to this view of
disenfranchisement. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 42-44 (1885) (holding that
disenfranchisement of polygamists is not a criminal punishment, but an application of electoral
qualifications); see also cases collected in Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 125, at 729 n.71. But see infra
note 134 (cases describing disenfranchisement as punishment).
129. The "purity of the ballot box" is a nebulous concept that originated in an Alabama state case
decided more than a century ago. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884). "The presumption is, that
one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of great moral turpitude,
is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage ... upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed by
the State with the toga of political citizenship." Id.
130. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048
(1968) ("A contention that the equal protection clause requires New York to allow convicted mafiosi to
vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit but as obviously so as anything can
be.").
131. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
132. See Note, The Need for Reform, supra note 125, at 593-94. Given the racially discriminatory use
of voting restrictions in the post-Reconstruction South, it is ironic that "[r]epugnance for corrupt elections
was put forward everywhere as the primary reason for disfranchisement [of blacks]." WOODWARD, supra
note I, at 326.
133. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 80 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
the long list of sections in the California code penalizing election fraud "surely derrionstrates that there are
adequate alternatives to disenfranchisement").
134. See, e.g., Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968) (noting the "historic exclusion from the franchise of persons convicted of all or certain types
of felonies"). For a discussion of the history of disenfranchisement, see Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 125,
at 721-27. Most ancient, medieval, and early modem societies conceived of disenfranchisement as a form
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disenfranchises ex-convicts punishes the ex-convict not for his offense, but for
his status.1 35 He is "continuously 'guilty' of a prescribed offense ... even
though he may not have exhibited criminal behavior for many years and may
be completely rehabilitated."' 36 Indeed, according to the American Bar
Association, efforts to rehabilitate offenders are thwarted by "counterproductive
stigmatization of exoffenders," which may increase recidivism. 137 Punitive
disenfranchisement of incarcerated and nonincarcerated offenders is
constitutionally problematic.13t It also makes little theoretical sense: the same
of punishment. In Rome, an offender could be deprived of the right to vote if, as part of his censure, the
label "infamia" was cast upon him. A.H.J. GREENBRIDGE, INFAMIA: ITS PLACE IN ROMAN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LAW 9 (1894). During the Middle Ages, extreme punishments included deprivation of all civil
rights and excommunication from the community; ultimately, society thought of the outlaw as nothing more
than a wild animal. CARLO CALISSE, A HISTORY OF ITALIAN LAW 300 (1928) (comparing outlaw to "a
wolf... [who] might live like a wild beast in the forests"); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC NV.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 449 (Legal Classics Library
1982) (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 1899) ("[Flor a wild beast he is; not merely is he a 'friendless
man,' he is a wolf."). England's attainder system maintained the loss of civil rights as a penalty, along with
forfeiture of property and "corruption of blood" (loss of the right to inherit property or transmit property
to one's descendants). Grant et al., supra note 125, at 943. The notion of punitive disenfranchisement also
has had some currency in American law. At least two states, Delaware and New Jersey, explicitly allow
for ex-felon disenfranchisement as an additional penalty. DEL. CONST. art. V., § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:4-1(6)-(7) (West 1989). Some courts have also justified disenfranchisement as punishment. For
example, in Wesley v. Collins, the circuit court stated that felons are disenfranchised "because of their
conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention and punishment."
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Singleton v. State, 21
So. 21, 23 (Fla. 1896) (construing civil disabilities as punishment).
135. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that state punishment of status as drug
addict is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual); see Note, The Need for Reform, supra note 125, at 600
n.l11 (comparing status as a former addict in Robinson with status as a former offender). Though
disenfranchisement is often described as retribution for the offender's breach of the social contract, see, e.g.,
Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968), this
justification distorts traditional Lockean contract theory. See Note, Citizenship, supra note 125, at 1304-07.
136. Reback, supra note 52, at 859-60 (footnote omitted).
137. Ex-Offenders Voting Rights, supra note 35, at 30 (statement of John Dunne, Member, American
Bar Association Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services). "The offender finds himself released
from prison, ready to start life anew and yet at election time still subject to the humiliating implications
of disenfranchisement, a factor that may lead to recidivism." Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 125, at 732;
cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring):
[Deprivation of citizenship is] the very antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of guiding the
offender back into the useful paths of society it excommunicates him and makes him, literally,
an outcast. I can think of no more certain way in which to make a man in whom, perhaps, rest
the seeds of serious antisocial behavior more likely to pursue further a career of unlawful
activity than to place on him the stigma of derelict ....
138. Disenfranchisement laws may violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. See Reback, supra note 52, at 858-59 (arguing that the decrease in number of states
disenfranchising ex-felons undermines the argument that the practice fails to meet the "unusual" standard).
See generally Tims, supra note 125. These laws may also violate the Equal Protection Clause because they
arbitrarily select certain crimes as disenfranchising offenses, See Note, The Need for Reform, supra note
125, at 587 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1943) (invalidating discrimination on basis of
illogical distinctions among cases)); see also Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970)
(striking down disenfranchisement statute for "haphazard development" and "contrasts in treatment"). States
that disenfranchise individuals convicted of federal crimes or crimes committed in another state may also
be impermissibly penalizing them for prior offenses. Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1966).
Moreover, courts have ruled that punishments for those on probation and parole must be "reasonably related
to the state's rehabilitation system." Hyland v. Procunier, 311 R Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Additionally, these punishments "must relate directly to the offense." People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr.
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"penalty" of disenfranchisement is applied to a convict spending twenty years
in prison for murder and a petty thief who spent five minutes plea bargaining
for probation-and the punishment itself suits neither of their crimes.
Disenfranchisement may only be appropriate as a response to election
crimes.1 39 Just as a state may legitimately penalize a convicted drunk driver
by revoking his driver's license, a state may arguably be justified in depriving
a citizen who abuses the voting process of the right to vote. Additionally, only
those who commit election offenses can be justifiably disenfranchised to meet
the nonpunitive goal of protecting the ballot from future fraud.
D. Applying a Remedy
After a court finds that a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
has occurred, it should, according to Senate legislative history, "exercise its
traditional equitable powers to fashion relief so that it completely remedies the
prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity
for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice."
140
Judges have issued temporary and permanent injunctions to alter election
practices,' 41 but legislatures are also called upon to adopt new laws or
procedures consistent with the court's ruling. 42
In light of the varying remedies applied in Voting Rights Act cases and
the faulty precedent of Wesley v. Collins, this Note proposes the following
remedies for cases in which criminal disenfranchisement laws are held to
violate section 2 of the Act. First, a court that finds that a disenfranchising law
impermissibly denies minority offenders' right to vote should strike down the
law and enjoin the state from disenfranchising nonwhite and white offenders
alike. Nonincarcerated offenders and ex-offenders would be allowed to register
and vote in the same manner as other citizens; incarcerated offenders would
be allowed to vote by absentee ballot, as they now are able to do in some
290, 294 (Ct. App. 1967).
139. Cf. H.R. 9020, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a) (1973) (advocating federal voting rights for all
former offenders except those who committed election offenses); Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 50,
at 137-38; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 125, at 315; see also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 51, § 1,
ch. 55, § 42 (Vest 1991) (disenfranchising only offenders convicted of election crimes).
140. SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 208. In keeping with the Act's provision that minorities do
not have a right under the Act to proportional electoral representation, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988), the
Senate legislative history suggests that the remedy of "racial quotas" should not be available to judges.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 208. However, each group "does have a right to an opportunity, equal
to that of other classes, to obtain such representation." Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 148 (2d
Cir. 1985).
141. See, e.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 350 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (enjoining "appellants
from conducting elections pursuant to those portions of the [redistricting] plan" held to violate section 2).
142. See, e.g., Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1269 (N.D.
Miss. 1987) (postponing injunctive relief to allow Mississippi legislature to remedy established violation),
aff'd, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's finding of violation and approving
legislature's remedy).
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states. 43 Second, a court that finds that a disenfranchising law impermissibly
dilutes a minority community's voting strength should fashion a form of relief
for the affected minority community that will compensate the community for
the weakness imposed upon it by the violative disenfranchising law. In most
cases, this will also mean striking down the disenfranchising law."4
I. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A JUDICIAL SOLUTION
After Richardson v. Ramirez, few plaintiffs-and, more importantly, even
fewer voting rights attorneys-are clamoring to attack criminal
disenfranchisement in the courts.' 45 In particular, the negative precedent
established by the district court's evisceration of the results test in Wesley v.
Collins probably has deterred plaintiffs from bringing cases against criminal
disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act. Opponents of criminal
disenfranchisement who have focused their efforts on state legislative reform
have made progress, but this piecemeal, incremental reform leaves millions of
offenders without the right to vote.146 While federal legislation could
mandate the enfranchisement of all offenders relatively swiftly, such legislation
would be almost impossible to enact in America's current climate of retributive
zeal against convicted criminals, including ex-offenders who have served their
time. 47 Therefore, the most viable way to break the silence 4 imposed
143. See supra note 14. A court could also limit its remedy by allowing a state to continue to
disenfranchise incarcerated offenders or by only requiring the state to extend the franchise to ex-offenders
who are fully released from the correctional supervision.
144. A new question in the vote dilution arena is the extent to which state justifications for
disenfranchisement will be considered after the plaintiff has satisfied section 2's results test. Recently, the
Supreme Court explained that a state's interest in electing judges on a district-wide basis could affect the
remedies that a court might apply if the court found a violation of section 2 (and could even prevent such
a finding under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis). Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of
Tex., 111 S.Ct. 2376, 2380-81 (1991). But the Court declared that no interest was sufficient to make the
voting restriction immune from section 2's results test. Id. Similarly, no state interest in excluding offenders
from the electorate would be sufficient to render a state's disenfranchisement law immune from challenge
under the results test. Moreover, state justifications for disenfranchisement are too weak to be of any
assistance to the defendant at either the liability or remedy stage. See supra notes 125-39 and
accompanying text.
145. Society's continued disdain for criminal offenders may also explain why criminal
disenfranchisement is rarely challenged. Members of minority-advocacy groups like the NAACP, for
example, may be too preoccupied with trying to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens to commit their
organization's limited resources to fighting for the rights of those who have committed crimes.
146. While studies of state legislatures' reform and/or repeal of criminal disenfranchisement laws do
not exist, it appears that as many as 17 states that disenfranchised ex-offenders two decades ago have
abandoned the practice. Compare CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DISFRANCHISEMENT OF CONVICTED
FELONS (rev. ed. 1971) with information provided supra note 16. However, there has been substantially
less rescission of laws that disenfranchise incarcerated and nonincarcerated offenders. Compare
DISFRANCHISEMENT OF CONVICTED FELONS, supra, with information provided supra notes 14-15. For an
estimate of the number of Americans who are disenfranchised as a result of their past or present status as
criminal offenders, see supra note 17.
147. Nevertheless, I offer two particularly ambitious federal legislative strategies that Congress could
pursue. First, Congress could amend the Voting Rights Act to guarantee the right to vote either to all
ex-offenders fully released from the criminal justice system, or to all ex-offenders and all non-incarcerated
offenders, or to all offenders including those who are incarcerated. This action would be similar to that
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upon millions of disenfranchised offenders and ex-offenders is through
vigorous litigation under the Voting Rights Act.
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taken by Congress in 1970, when it amended the Voting Rights Act to abolish literacy tests throughout the
nation. See supra note 13. This proposal resembles a bill proposed unsuccessfully in 1973 by Rep. Robert
W. Kastenmeier to "amend the Voting Rights Act of 1970 to prohibit the States from denying the right to
vote in Federal elections to former criminal offenders who have not been convicted of any offense related
to voting or elections and who are not confined in a correctional institution." H.R. 9020, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). The bill stated that disenfranchisement of nonelection offenders "does not bear a reasonable
relationship to the criminal offense sufficient to warrant the deprivation of such right to vote.., and does
not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest." Id. at 3. During hearings on the bill,
Rep, Kastenmeier said that he originally wanted the law to cover state and local elections. Ex-Offenders
Voting Rights, supra note 35, at 14. Additionally, he expressed interest in doing away with the bill's
exceptions for election offenders, id. at 15 ("Is it unthinkable that those people, too, should still be able
to vote?"), and incarcerated offenders, id. ("If we assume that offenders, exoffenders, might vote on the
outside, what about those on the inside? ... [WI]hat is the real State interest in denying those presently
incarcerated from voting?").
Second, and even more ambitiously, Congress could propose for ratification a Universal Suffrage
Amendment to cure once and for all the deficiencies of the Constitution with regard to voting rights. An
affirmatively worded amendment might read:
Section 1. All citizens of the United States who are eighteen years of age or older have the right
to vote.
Section 2. This right shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State.
Section 3. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1 of this hypothetical amendment starkly contrasts with the Constitution's negatively worded voting
amendments, which employ only the "shall not be denied or abridged" language included in section 2 of
the proposed amendment. See U.S. CONST., amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
148. The inherent relationship between deprivation of rights and silencing has been articulated by
many feminist and critical race theorists. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 425-26 (1987) ("One consequence of
this broader reconfiguration of rights.., is to give voice to those people or things which ... historically
had no voice."). Though securing voting rights for offenders might be seen by some as a mere band-aid
on a gaping wound of hopelessness and social stigmatization, the symbolic worth of enfranchisement should
not be underestimated. "The concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship,
our participatoriness, our relation to others." Id. at 431.
149. Other avenues of litigation should also be explored. For example, Justice Rehnquist wrote in
Ramirez that "how [section 2] became a part of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is less important than what
it says and what it means." Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (emphasis added); see also
Ramirez, id. at 45 (calling for a "plain reading" of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Ramirez
Court's literalist reading of the Constitution might allow for a creative, literal reading of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which says, in relevant part: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged.., on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § I (emphasis added). The Fifteenth Amendment's framers almost surely did not intend "previous
condition of servitude" to include having "served" time in a state penitentiary, but this interpretation is not
entirely inconsistent with Rehnquist's open-ended reading of "other crime." See supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. Before Ramirez, commentators pointed out that the Thirteenth Amendment suggests
that "punishment for crime" and "servitude" might not be mutually exclusive: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added). Therefore, one
commentator noted, "[a]n in pari materia construction of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments supports
the contention that 'previous condition of servitude' includes penal confinement." Grant et al., supra note
125, at 1174. See also Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 125, at 740 n.128. This rather clever argument was
also made unsuccessfully by the defendant in People v. DeStefano, 212 N.E.2d 357, 361-62 (11. App. Ct.
1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966). Additionally, one bona fide definition of "servitude" is
"[c]ompulsory labour as a punishment for criminals." 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 43 (2d ed.
1989). After Ramirez invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to allow states to exclude a whole class of
citizens from the electorate, this radical, "plain meaning" reading of the Fifteenth Amendment seems all
the more appropriate.
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In part, this litigation strategy is a belated response to the intentionally
racist use of criminal disenfranchisement throughout the South a century ago.
In practical terms, it is a plan that relies on the fact that criminal
disenfranchisement laws have a disproportionate impact on minority offenders.
But the goal of this strategy, as stated at the outset of this Note, is not to make
disenfranchisement laws "race neutral" or even primarily to reverse the
disenfranchisement of nonwhite offenders. Rather, the goal is to harness the
power of the Voting Rights Act's results test to attack criminal
disenfranchisement laws where they are most vulnerable. If construed properly,
the Act could go a long way toward abolishing criminal disenfranchisement
and restoring the right to vote to a class of millions of powerless citizens.
One of these citizens, an inmate in a New York state prison, recently
wrote a letter to New York City's Daily News explaining why he and 300
other prisoners are seeking the right to vote:
We believe that the law that takes away a prisoner's right to vote has
a crippling effect on so-called minority communities' attempts at
political empowerment .... So-called minorities are more likely than
whites to be incarcerated when convicted of the same crimes ....
Allowing prisoners to vote would be a plus for black and Hispanic
ambitions-and maybe that is why it is not allowed. Moreover, it has
rehabilitative attributes, as it gives the prisoner a sense of belonging,
instead of confirming isolationist feelings towards society. We believe
the [New York] Legislature's decision to deny the incarcerated the
right to vote ... is unfair and constitutionally invalid. Given the
findings of racial discrimination inherent in the criminal justice
mechanism at the accusatory, trial, and punishment phases, to continue
to deny prisoners the right to vote perpetuates racial oppression and
exploitation. 50
150. Theodore Baker, Balloting Behind Bars, DAILY NEWS, July 27, 1993, at 32 (letter to the editor).
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